Maliki's Stand Changes US Counter-Insurgency in Iraq

Ezra Klein of The American Prospect notes the meaning of Prime Minister Maliki's desire to set a troop withdrawal date for US counter-insurgency (COIN) strategy in Iraq.

There's been a tendency over the past week -- which I've engaged in as well -- to treat Maliki's comments as if they're a largely political story. But the Iraqi government's stated desire to see Americans set a date for withdrawal has implications far beyond the (US Presidential) horserace. Rather, if you believe in the counterinsurgency doctrine Petraeus wrote -- as McCain claims he does, and as Petraeus certainly should -- then this changes everything. Counterinsurgency doctrine relies on political legitimacy: Bolstering the legitimacy of the government as the rightful authority within the state, and weakening that of the insurgency. The Iraqi government clearly see ejecting America as a crucial test of legitimacy.

Ilan Goldenberg elaborates.

In this context the United States must listen to the Iraqi government's demands or risk endangering the gains that have been made during the past 18 months. Over that time the Iraqi government and its security forces have increasingly taken a more central role in providing security and have increased their legitimacy in the eyes of the people. However, one of the key elements still working against them is the heavy dependence on the U.S. military presence, which is highly unpopular inside Iraq.

Thus, Maliki's recent declaration was not, as John McCain would have you believe, just the Iraqi government playing politics. Instead, it was a genuine attempt by the Iraqi government to increase its legitimacy with its people -- a critical element of counterinsurgency. One of the main factors limiting the Iraqi government’s credibility with its own people is its complete dependence on the United States. Maliki's declarations were meant to limit that perception and shore up domestic support. After coming out so strongly and publicly for a gradual American withdrawal, the Maliki government has made it all but impossible to walk back. If it were to now sign an agreement that did not include some specific target dates for withdrawal or that tried to preserve the permanent South Korea-like presence that John McCain has long advocated, it would be seen by its own people as a weak American puppet instead of the legitimate government that it must become.