Costs of Torture Ignored by Proponents

Julian Sanchez makes a strong point about the failure of proponents of torture to adequately address its costs (h/t Andrew Sullivan).

...it seems as though torture ever yields important and actionable intelligence more quickly than alternative methods, we’re supposed to take it for granted that this completes the necessary utilitarian analysis. And this is just absurd. How does torture affect the willingness of enemy combatants to surrender? How much does it complicate our relations with allies? How many people does it help to radicalize against the United States? How many non-radicals does it leave sufficiently disgusted that they’re less motivated to assist the U.S. in fighting radicalism in their communities? You’ll notice that torture-fans never really attempt to deal remotely seriously with any of these questions; they just babble inanities about how Fanatics Will Hate Us No Matter What. Which, of course, some will—but that’s hardly to the point, is it?

Some of the more thoughtful and least hysterical commentary on the question has come from Philip Zelikow, former executive director of the 9/11 Commission and Deputy Secretary of State under Condi Rice in W.'s second term (see his Foreign Policy blog as well as New York Times op-ed). Zelikow says the benefit of getting useful information faster using harsh methods must be weighed against the costs. These costs include the false information such methods also produce along with the time spent separating the wheat from the chaff. He also points out the damage torture does to US soft power.

There is another variable in the intelligence equation: the help you lose because your friends start keeping their distance. When I worked at the State Department, some of America’s best European allies found it increasingly difficult to assist us in counterterrorism because they feared becoming complicit in a program their governments abhorred. This was not a hypothetical concern.

A thoughtful inquiry parsing the pros and cons is necessary — but it may not end up finding much, if any, net intelligence value from using extreme methods. It should also consider the future of the C.I.A.: over the long haul, it might be best for the agency if its reputation rested on outstanding professional standards and patient expertise.

--Ballard Burgher